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Individualism and sensitivity of investment to stock prices: Evidence 
from emerging markets 
 
 
Abstract 
Chui et al. (2010) argue that cultures with high levels of individualism are defined by 
overconfidence and self-attribution bias. Markus and Kitayama (1991) and Heine et al. 
(1999) note that these biases lead to less efficient stock prices with excess volatility. Foucault 
and Frésard (2012) show that sensitivity of investment to stock prices is an increasing 
function of informativeness of stock prices. They argue that sensitivity of investment to stock 
prices increase because value-maximizing managers are forced to use all available 
information to forecast the cash flows of their capital allocation decisions. They argue that 
information revealed via informative stock prices is new to value maximizing managers. 
Consequently, these managers incorporate this information in their analysis, thereby 
increasing sensitivity of investment to informative stock prices. This paper argues that 
individualism, being a significant determinant of information content in stock prices, can also 
affect sensitivity of investment to stock prices. Using data from 37 emerging markets, our 
results show that individualism significantly reduces sensitivity of investment to stock prices 
during the period between 2008 and 2014. Our results are robust to alternate estimation 
procedures. Our results also indicate that the effect of individualism on sensitivity of 
investment to stock prices is more pronounced when investment expenditures are large.  
Moreover, we also show that the impact of individualism on the sensitivity of investment to 
stock prices is moderated by the institutional, social, and cultural environment of the 
country.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that individualism effects informativeness of stock 
prices by influencing country’s information environment and investors’ trading behaviors. 
Chui et al. (2010), for example, argue that cultures with high levels of individualism are 
defined by overconfidence and self-attribution bias. Markus and Kitayama (1991) and Heine 
et al. (1999) note that these biases lead to less efficient stock prices with excess volatility. 
Given significant impact of individualism on informativeness of stock prices, it is very much 
possible that it also affect sensitivity of investment to stock prices. Our argument is 
consistent with Foucault and Frésard (2012) who show that sensitivity of investment to 
stock prices is an increasing function of informativeness of stock prices. They document that 
sensitivity of investment to stock prices increases as stock prices become more informative. 
They argue that sensitivity of investment to stock prices increase because value-maximizing 
managers are forced to use all available information to forecast the cash flows of their capital 
allocation decisions. Their forecasts depend not only on their own private information but 
also on stock prices because informative stock prices reflect private information of informed 
investors. They argue that information revealed via informative stock prices is new to value 
maximizing managers. Consequently, these managers incorporate this information in their 
analysis, thereby increasing sensitivity of investment to informative stock prices. This paper 
argues that individualism, being a significant determinant of information content in stock 
prices, can also affect sensitivity of investment to stock prices. 
Consistent with our arguments, this paper documents that sensitivity of investment 
to stock prices is affected by individualism. Using data from 37 emerging markets, our results 
show that individualism significantly reduces sensitivity of investment to stock prices during 
the period between 2008 and 2014. Consistent with prior literature, we argue that managers 
in individualistic cultures overestimate their abilities (Markus and Kitayama, 1991; Heine et 
al., 1999). Therefore, they are more likely to overweight their own information and give less 
than optimal weight to information revealed via stock prices in their investment decisions. 
As a result, sensitivity of investment to stock prices weakens in individualistic cultures. Our 
results are robust to alternate estimation procedures. Our results also indicate that the effect 
of individualism on sensitivity of investment to stock prices is more pronounced when 
investment expenditures are large. Our analysis from quantile regression shows that the 
impact of individualism on sensitivity of investment to stock prices is high at higher points 
of conditional distribution of investment expenditures.  
Small investment expenditure carry less consequential outcomes compared to higher levels 
of expenditure since the larger the investment the riskier it becomes (Sanders and 
Hambrick, 2007). As a result of the risk associated with high levels of investment 
expenditure, it takes several stages for a firm to take the decision to make such large 
expenditure (Crundwell, 2008). This further accentuate the effect of culture on investment 
expenditure since it gets accumulated throughout the decision makers.   
Furthermore, our results also show that institutional environment at the country 
level has significant implications for the impact of individualism on sensitivity of investment 
to stock prices. We show that sensitivity of investment to stock prices is stronger in countries 
where individualism is complemented by stronger institutional environment than in 
countries where individualism is accompanied by weaker institutional infrastructure. We 
argue that stock prices in countries with strong institutions are more informative and higher 
information content in stock prices make any behavioral biases that may exist due to 
individualism less pronounced (Ackert and Athanassakos, 1997). 
We also show that the impact of individualism on the sensitivity of investment to 
stock prices is moderated by the social and cultural environment of the country. The 
countries with more heterogeneous societies (ethnic fractionalization and linguistic 
fractionalization) tend to increase the negative impact of individualism on sensitivity of 
investment to stock prices than other countries. We argue that heterogeneity lowers the 
information content in stock prices by affecting the quality of institutions. Given the 
relatively more inefficient stock prices, individualism reduces sensitivity of investment to 
stock prices in societies with higher heterogeneity. Furthermore, we also show that the 
negative impact of individualism on sensitivity of investment to stock prices is more 
pronounced in countries with high power distance than in countries with low power 
distance. In case of uncertainty avoidance and masculinity, our results show that sensitivity 
of investment to stock prices is stronger in cultures where individualism is complemented 
by high uncertainty avoidance or high masculinity than in cultures where individualism is 
accompanied by low uncertainty avoidance or low masculinity. Countries with high power 
distance have inadequate disclosure since they have cultures that discourage information 
sharing (Zarzeski, 1996). This results in less informative stock prices and therefore lower 
sensitivity of investment to stock prices in individualistic cultures with high power distance. 
Regarding masculinity, firms with high masculinity are more transparent when reporting 
information and have stricter protection of shareholders’ rights (de Jong and Semenov, 
2002; Gray et al., 2012). This results in higher sensitivity of investment to stock prices in 
individualistic cultures with high masculinity. Moreover, cultures with high uncertainty 
avoidance are characterized by carefully planning and implementing rules and regulations 
resulting in high information content in stock prices (Amirhosseini, 2012). Accordingly, 
higher sensitivity of investment to stock prices in individualistic cultures occurs when it is 
complemented with high uncertainty avoidance.           
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 documents motivation 
and background for this paper. Section 3 summarizes the data. Section 4 presents 
assessment of our hypothesis. Section 5 presents additional tests, while Section 6 discusses 
our results. The paper ends with Section 7 where we present conclusions. 
 
2. Motivation and background 
 
Information is the key to efficient functioning of the stock markets. Securities get 
priced correctly when all relevant information about firms enters the market. Stock market 
agents, such as investors and analysts, play an important role in this process by bringing out 
new information. Information brought out by the stock market agents is aggregated via 
trading process and is transmitted through prices (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980; Glosten and 
Milgrom, 1985; Kyle, 1985). Prior literature argues that information conveyed via stock 
prices has remarkable ability to accurately forecast predictions about real outcomes (Roll, 
1984). Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004) note that stock market predictions are better than 
predictions made by polls and other devices. 
Given significant ability of stock prices to reveal value-relevant information, 
managers have used them to learn about the future prospects of their firms. Prior literature 
argues that stock prices help managers find out what stock market participants think about 
their firms (Dow and Gorton, 1997; Subrahmanyam and Titman, 1999). For some stock 
market participants, the only channel available to communicate their information to firms is 
the stock prices. Stock prices, therefore, contain information that is not known to managers. 
An example of this is the information about demand of firm’s products or information about 
competition with other firms.  Foucault and Frésard (2012) argue that managers use 
information conveyed via stock prices in making decisions on corporate investments. They 
show that sensitivity of corporate investment to stock price increases as the amount of 
information in stock prices increase. They argue that investment sensitivity to stock prices 
increase because value maximizing managers are forced to use information transmitted via 
stock prices to forecast cash flows of their capital allocation decisions. Their forecasts 
depend not only on their own information but also on information conveyed via stock prices 
(because stock prices reflect information that is not known to them). They argue that value 
maximizing managers are inclined to use this information to improve their investment 
decisions. It, therefore, leads to higher sensitivity of investment to stock prices. In another 
related study, Chen et al. (2007) also come to same conclusion by showing that investment 
sensitivity to stock prices is an increasing function of informativeness of stock prices.  
In this paper, we posit that validity of above arguments – sensitivity of investment to stock 
prices – is conditional upon the cultural traits of the country. An important cultural 
characteristic that can affect sensitivity of investment to stock prices is the degree of 
individualism in a country. Individualism refers to the extent to which people hold an 
independent rather than an interdependent self-image. It measures the extent to which 
people are integrated into groups and reflects the degree to which they focus on their 
unique internal attributes to differentiate themselves from others (Baumeister, 1999). 
Markus and Kitayama (1991) argue that people in individualist cultures take decisions “by 
reference to one’s own internal repertoire of thoughts, feelings, and action, rather than by 
reference to the thoughts, feelings, and actions of others”. Unlike people in individualist 
cultures, people in collectivist cultures address problems by including all contributing 
entities of a certain situation rather than focusing on a single individual (Markus and 
Kitayama, 1991). Zhan (2013) argues that collectivism is manifested in imitation of 
decisions of others since people in that culture value “conformity to others” and “harmony”, 
unlike people in individualist cultures who are independent and self-reliant. 
We argue that individualism influences sensitivity of investment to stock prices via 
number of channels: 
 First, individualism affects the information transmission capacity of stock prices. Prior 
literature argues that individualistic cultures are characterized by certain biases that can 
lead to stock prices that may be convey less than optimal information about fundamental 
values. Markus and Kitayama (1991) and Heine et al. (1999), for example, note that 
people in individualistic cultures overestimate their abilities. These cultures are, 
therefore, characterized by overconfidence and self-attribution bias (Markus and 
Kitayama, 1991; Kagitcibasi, 1997; Bank and Brustabauer, 2014). Chui et al. (2010) argue 
that overconfidence and self-attribution bias in individualistic cultures translate into 
higher volatility of stock prices. Beckmann et al. (2008) note that overconfidence 
associated with individualistic cultures lead investors to analyze information on their 
own and be less concerned about opinions of the others. As a result, individualistic 
cultures are marked by greater dispersion in investor’s opinion about fundamental 
values. It may, therefore, lower the informativeness of stock prices. 
 Second, self-attribution bias prevalent in individualistic cultures causes investors to 
underweight public signals. Therefore, a typical investor in an individualist society would 
invest in a firm depending only on his private information and his self-confidence. His 
decision will not be affected if it contradicts with what the public information shows. 
Jessop et al. (2015) argue that investors in individualistic societies believe in the accuracy 
of, and consequently depends on, their private information while taking investment 
decisions while underestimating public information. 
Therefore, we posit that managers from individualistic cultures are less likely to use 
information revealed via stock prices in their investment decisions, thereby decreasing the 
sensitivity of investment to stock prices. Our arguments is consistent with Daniel et al. 
(1998) who argue that overconfidence leads investors to overweight the precision of their 
private signals, and self-attribution bias causes them to underweight public signals about a 
stock’s value. Furthermore, we also argue that higher stock market volatilities in 
individualistic cultures make stock prices less informative. As a result, we should expect 
reduction in sensitivity of investment to stock prices.  
 
3. Data 
 
This paper documents the effect of individualism on the sensitivity of investment to 
stock prices in emerging markets during the period between 2008 and 2014. For the purpose 
of this study, our sample consists of non-financial firms listed in Argentina, Bangladesh, 
Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech Republic, Egypt, Ghana, Greece, Hungary, 
India, Indonesia, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, 
Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Sri Lanka, 
Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, UAE, Venezuela, and Vietnam. The following sub-sections will 
explain data in greater details. 
 
3.1 Dependent variable: Investment 
 
Investment (CAPEX) is a measure of corporate investment in year t. It is measured by 
the ratio of capital expenditures in that year scaled by lagged book assets (Foucault and 
Frésard, 2012). 
 
3.2 Independent variables 
3.2.1 Individualism 
 
Individualism (IND) measures the extent to which a society stresses the role of a 
group versus that of an individual. It indicates whether members of a society look only after 
themselves and their immediate family, or belong to groups which look after them. People in 
individualist societies have an ‘I' consciousness and for them individual interests prevail, 
while people in collectivist societies have a ‘We' consciousness and for them collective 
interests prevail. Hofstede’s individualism index is used to determine the extent of 
individualism. Table 1 documents the extent of individualism in our sample countries. Our 
results indicate that, on average, Latin American countries have the lowest level of 
individualism, followed by Asian countries, African countries, and European countries. 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
3.2.2 Stock prices 
 
This paper uses Tobin’Q (Q) as a measure of normalized prices. We compute Q as the 
market value of equity plus book value of assets minus the book value of equity, scaled by 
book assets (Foucault and Frésard, 2012). 
 
3.2.3 Control variables 
 
This paper uses four sets of control variables that account for various dimensions of 
firm-specific characteristics, country-specific institutional environment, social environment, 
and cultural environment.  
 The variables used to capture various aspects of firm-specific characteristics are log of 
total assets (SIZE), total debt to total asset ratio (LEVERAGE), growth in total assets 
(GROWTH), earnings per share (EPS), number of analysts covering a firm (ANALYST), 
and accounting standards followed by a firm (IFRS).  
 The variables representing country-specific institutional environment are extent of rule 
of law (RLAW), degree of investment freedom (FINVEST), and degree of trade freedom 
(FTRADE). 
 Ethnic fractionalization (ETHNIC), religious fractionalization (RELIGIOUS), and linguistic 
fractionalization (LINGUISTIC) are used to control for various dimensions of country-
specific social environment. 
 The variables representing country-specific cultural environment are power distance 
(PDISTANCE), uncertainty avoidance (UAVOIDANCE), and masculinity (MASCULINITY). 
 
 
4. Methodology 
 
In order to document, the impact of individualism on sensitivity of investment to 
stock prices, we estimate the following regression equation with capital expenditure 
(CAPEX) as a dependent variable and Tobin’s Q, (Q), individualism (IND), and interaction 
between Tobin’s Q and individualism (Q*IND) as independent variables. As indicated above, 
we also include above mentioned control variables in the regression equation. For the 
purpose of completeness, we also include industry dummies (IDUM) and year dummies in 
our analysis. Our basic regression equation is defined as follows. We estimate various 
versions of the following equation in this paper. Our estimation is similar in spirit to earlier 
studies, such as Foucault and Frésard (2012). 
CAPEXt = α + β1(Qt−1) + β2(INDLt−1) + β3(Qt−1 ∗ INDt−1) + β4(SIZEt−1)
+ β
5
(LEVERAGEt−1) + β6(GROWTHt−1) + β7(EPSt−1)
+ β
8
(ANALYSTt−1) + β9(IFRSt−1) + β10(RLAWt−1)
+ β
11
(FINVESTt−1) + β12(FTRADEt−1) + β13(ETHNICt−1)
+ β
14
(RELIGIOUSt−1) + β15(LINGUISTICt−1) + β16(PDISTANCEt−1)
+ β
17
(UAVOIDANCEt−1) + β18(MASCULINITYt−1) + ∑ γ
Ind
N
Ind=1
(IDUM)
+ ∑ θYr
N
Yr=1
(YDUM) + εt 
(1) 
The results of our analysis are reported in Table 2. Consistent with prior literature, we 
show significantly positive relationship not only between investment and stock prices but 
also between investment and individualism (Foucault and Frésard, 2012; Shao et al., 2013). 
We report significantly positive coefficients for Q and IND for all estimations. Furthermore, 
consistent with our arguments, this paper also shows that individualism reduces the 
sensitivity of investment to stock prices. We report significantly negative coefficient of 
Q*IND for all estimations. We argue that managers in individualistic cultures overestimate 
their abilities and undervalue the opinion of others (Markus and Kitayama, 1991; Heine et 
al., 1999; Jureviciene, 2012). Therefore, they are more likely to overweight their own 
information and give less than optimal weight to public information revealed via stock 
prices in their investment decisions. As a result, the sensitivity of investment to stock 
prices weakens in individualistic cultures. 
 [Insert Table 2 here] 
 
5. Additional tests 
5.1 Estimation with clustered standard errors 
 
As an additional test, we compute the standard errors by clustering the observations 
within each firm. Peterson (2009) considers such clustering as a mechanism to account for 
serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. Our unreported results show that significance of 
variables remains qualitatively the same. 
 
5.2 Estimation with quantile regression 
 
Our analysis implies that no matter what point on the conditional distribution is 
analyzed, the impact of individualism on the sensitivity of investment to stock prices remains 
the same. This may not be the true reflection of this relationship. We argue that qualitative 
factors, such as cultural characteristics, are more important in determining investment 
decisions when investment expenditures are large. For smaller investment expenditures, 
cultural characteristics may not be very important. Small investment expenditure carry less 
consequential outcomes compared to higher levels of expenditure since the larger the 
investment the riskier it becomes (Sanders and Hambrick, 2007). As a result of the risk 
associated with high levels of investment expenditure, it takes several stages for a firm to 
take the decision to make such large expenditure; the investment has to be approved by the 
division then the corporate investment committee, and finally the CEO and the board of 
directors (Crundwell, 2008). It can be deducted that these various stages further accentuate 
the effect of the dominant culture on investment expenditure since the effect will be 
accumulated throughout the stages.  Moreover, value maximizing managers will not take 
much time and effort to incorporate sources of information, like stock prices, to take small 
investment decisions as opposed to larger risky ones. Regarding individualism, the higher 
the level of individualism in a culture the more corporate risk taking is encouraged (Rehbein, 
2014). Accordingly, at higher levels of risk, individualism effect on investment becomes more 
material. To test the empirical validity of our argument, we estimate Equation (1) at different 
points of conditional distribution of investment expenditures. For the purpose of this paper, 
we use quantile regression to estimate Equation (1) at five quantiles (namely 0.10, 0.30, 0.50, 
0.70, and 0.90). The results of our analysis are reported in Table 3. Our results confirm our 
earlier findings that individualism reduces the sensitivity of investment to stock prices. We 
report significantly negative coefficient of Q*IND for all quantiles. However, as expected, our 
results also show that the ability of individualism to reduce sensitivity of investment to stock 
prices is high when investment expenditures are large. We report consistent increase in the 
magnitude of the coefficient estimates of Q*IND from 0.10 quantile to 0.90 quantile. This 
result is also supported by the coefficient estimates of Q and IND. Our results also show 
consistent increase in the magnitude of the coefficient estimates of Q and IND from 0.10 
quantile to 0.90 quantile. It highlights the fact that stock prices and individualism are more 
important for determining investment expenditures when investment expenditures are 
large. 
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
5.3 Individualism and sensitivity of investment to stock prices in different sub-samples 
 
There may be concerns that our results are confined to certain stocks. In order to 
overcome this concern, we divide our sample into two sub-groups. First sub-group 
comprises of firms with size below the median size of the sample and second sub-group 
consists of firms with size above the median size of the sample. We re-estimate Equation (1) 
for both groups. The results of our analysis are reported in Table 4. Our results show that 
individualism reduces the sensitivity of investment to stock prices in large firms. We report 
significantly negative coefficient of Q*IND for large firms. However, for small firms, our 
results show no impact of individualism on the sensitivity of investment to stock prices. We 
report insignificant coefficient of Q*IND for small firms. This result is consistent with above 
arguments because smaller firms have low levels of investment expenditures and behavioral 
biases may be of lesser importance for these expenditures.  
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
6. Discussion of results 
 
We argued in Section 2 that individualistic cultures are characterized by 
overconfidence and self-attribution bias (Markus and Kitayama, 1991; Kagitcibasi, 1997). 
These biases lead managers to be less concerned about opinions of the others (Beckmann et 
al., 2008). Therefore, managers from individualistic cultures are more likely to overweight 
their private information in investment decisions, thereby weakening the sensitivity of 
investment to stock prices in these cultures (Daniel et al., 1998). Prior literature, however, 
also argues that behavioral biases are less pronounced when information asymmetries are 
low (Ackert and Athanassakos, 1997). Ackert and Athanassakos (1997) show that economic 
agents tend to be less biased in transparent information environments. Therefore, any 
factors that can help improve information environment can alter the effect of individualism 
on the sensitivity of investment to stock prices. In the following sub-sections, we briefly 
discuss the impact of country-specific institutional environment, social environment, and 
cultural environment on the relationship between individualism and the sensitivity of 
investment to stock prices. We consider institutional, social, and cultural factors to be 
important determinants of the information environment of the country. 
 
6.1 Effect of institutional environment on the relationship between individualism and 
sensitivity of investment to stock prices 
 
Institutions are defined as the set of informal and formal rules that regulate the 
interactions in a society (Kunsch et al, 2014). They include behavioral codes of conduct and 
laws and regulations, means of enforcing these rules, and sanctions for those who fail to 
abide by them (Assane & Chiang, 2014). A good institution is one that could maximize the 
productivity of its capital through increasing transparency of information about the market 
and enforcing property rights and other laws and regulations thus creating a competitive 
market (Kunsch et al, 2014; Assane & Chiang, 2014). For the purpose of this paper, we use 
the extent of rule of law (RLAW), the degree of investment freedom (FINVEST), and the 
degree of trade freedom (FTRADE) as proxies for the strength of country-specific 
institutional environment. Prior literature associates these mechanisms with the strength 
of country-specific institutions to varying degrees (La Porta et al., 1997; REFERENCE).  
Regarding the rule of law, Oxley and Yeung (2001) defines a strong rule of law as having 
"sound political institutions, a strong court system, and provisions for orderly succession of 
power. ..," as well as ". .. citizens [who] are willing to accept the established institutions and 
to make and implement laws and adjudicate disputes". Countries with good institutional 
environment are associated with an enforced strong rule of law (Kunsch et al, 2014). 
Kunsch et al (2014) add that a country with a strong rule of law signifies an institutional 
environment that is Legitimate. Furthermore, a strong rule of law reduces the uncertainty 
around business transactions since each party knows their legal rights, obligations, and 
consequences (Kunsch et al, 2014).  
As for degree of investment freedom, a country with freedom of investment have no 
constraints on investment capital flow (Hristova, 2012). Some of the most important 
constraints for freedom of investment are corruption, security problems, weak protection 
of property rights and lack of regulating rules (Heritage Foundation, 2015; Gwartney et 
al,2006). All these restrictions are the characteristics of a weak institutional environment. 
Accordingly, a strong institutional environment promotes investment since it has no 
investment cash flow constraints and this results in minimizing risk and uncertainty, 
protecting investors rights, and maximizing returns (Gwartney et al,2006; Mayer et al, 
2005).   
Regarding degree of trade freedom, Assane & Chiang (2014) states that the correlation 
between institutional quality and trade is more than that of the geography. The better the 
institutional quality the more the trade flow while bad institutional quality is associated 
with restrictions on trade (Dollar, 2002; Assane & Chiang, 2014). Good institutions have a 
strong legal systems that enforces contracts and ensures transparency which increases 
predictability, eases transactions , reduces costs, and creates an encouraging trading 
environment (Anderson and Marcouille, 2002; Fakher, 2014).      
Prior literature associates strength of institutional mechanisms at the country level 
with the informativeness of stock prices. Morck et al. (2000), for instance, argue that strength 
of country-specific institutional mechanisms promotes informed arbitrage activity based on 
private information. More demand for private information leads to more informative stock 
prices. This paper argues that there exists a direct relationship between informativeness of 
stock prices and the extent of information asymmetries. The more informative are the stock 
prices, the lower are the information asymmetries. Consequently, behavioral biases that 
emerge from individualism should be less pronounced in countries with strong institutions. 
We, therefore, expect managers from individualistic cultures with strong institutions to use 
information conveyed via stock prices more in their investment decisions than managers 
from individualistic cultures with weak institutions. As a result, we should observe higher 
sensitivity of investment to stock prices in individualistic cultures with strong institutions 
than in individualistic cultures with weak institutions. 
 
Sub hypothesis 1a: Sensitivity of investment to stock prices is higher in individualistic cultures 
with higher rule of law than in individualistic cultures with weak rule of law. 
 
Sub hypothesis 1b: Sensitivity of investment to stock prices is higher in individualistic cultures 
with higher investment freedom than in individualistic cultures with lower investment freedom. 
 
Sub hypothesis 1c: Sensitivity of investment to stock prices is higher in individualistic cultures 
with higher trade freedom than in individualistic cultures with lower trade freedom. 
 
In order to document the effect of country-specific institutional environment on the 
relationship between individualism and sensitivity of investment to stock prices, we 
estimate Equation (1) after introducing one of the following interaction terms in the analysis: 
Q*IND*RLAW, Q*IND*FINVEST, and Q*IND*FTRADE. The results of our analysis are 
reported in Table 5. Our results in this table confirm our earlier findings that individualism 
reduces the sensitivity of investment to stock prices. We report significantly negative 
coefficient of Q*IND for all estimations. However, as argued, our results also show that the 
ability of individualism to reduce sensitivity of investment to stock prices is less pronounced 
when country-specific institutional environment is strong. We report significantly positive 
coefficient of Q*IND*RLAW, Q*IND*FINVEST, and Q*IND*FTRADE. It indicates that 
sensitivity of investment to stock prices is higher in those individualistic cultures that have 
stronger institutional environment than individualistic cultures that have weaker 
institutional environment. 
 
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 6.2 Effect of cultural environment on the relationship between individualism and sensitivity of 
investment to stock prices 
 
This paper also argues that the impact of individualism on sensitivity of investment 
to stock prices is moderated by the cultural characteristics, such as power distance 
(PDISTANCE), uncertainty avoidance (UAVOIDANCE), and masculinity (MASCULINITY). Our 
assertion that cultural characteristics can affect the relationship between individualism and 
sensitivity of investment to stock prices depends on our understanding that cultural 
characteristics can affect the information content of stock prices. Zarzeski (1996), for 
instance, argues that cultures with high power distance are likely to have environments that 
discourage information sharing. Consequently, financial disclosure may be inadequate, 
thereby resulting in less informative stock prices. As a result, we expect lower sensitivity of 
investment to stock prices in individualistic cultures with high power distance than 
individualistic cultures with low power distance. Similarly, de Jong and Semenov (2002) 
argue that the protection of shareholders’ rights is stricter in masculine societies. As a result, 
firms are more transparent and it is hard for them to misreport information, thereby 
improving information content of stock prices (Gray et al., 2012). We, therefore, expect 
higher sensitivity of investment to stock prices in individualistic cultures with high 
masculinity than individualistic cultures with low masculinity. Furthermore, uncertainty 
avoidance is also related with the demand for information. In these cultures, individuals tend 
to avoid uncertainty, thereby making them collect and analyze as much information as 
possible. Amirhosseini (2012) argues that individuals in cultures with high uncertainty 
avoidance tend to minimize the occurrence of unknown and unusual circumstances by 
carefully planning and implementing rules, laws and regulations. Consequently, information 
content in stock prices is higher in cultures with high uncertainty avoidance (REFERENCE). 
We, therefore, expect higher sensitivity of investment to stock prices in individualistic 
cultures with high uncertainty avoidance than individualistic cultures with low uncertainty 
avoidance. 
 
Sub hypothesis 2a: Sensitivity of investment to stock prices is lower in individualistic cultures 
with higher power distance than in individualistic cultures with lower power distance. 
 
Sub hypothesis 2b: Sensitivity of investment to stock prices is higher in individualistic cultures 
with higher masculinity than in individualistic cultures with lower masculinity. 
 
Sub hypothesis 2c: Sensitivity of investment to stock prices is higher in individualistic cultures 
with higher uncertainty avoidance than in individualistic cultures with lower uncertainty 
avoidance. 
 
In order to document the effect of country-specific cultural environment on the 
relationship between individualism and sensitivity of investment to stock prices, we 
introduce the following interaction terms in Equation (1): Q*IND*PDISTANCE, 
Q*IND*UAVOIDANCE, and Q*IND*MASCULINITY. The results of our analysis are reported in 
Table 6. Our results in this table confirm our arguments of significant impact of cultural 
characteristics on the sensitivity of investment to stock prices. We report significantly 
negative coefficient of Q*IND*PDISTANCE and significantly positive coefficient of 
Q*IND*UAVOIDANCE, and Q*IND*MASCULINITY. It indicates that sensitivity of investment 
to stock prices is significantly affected by the cultural characteristics of the country. 
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
6.3 Effect of social environment on the relationship between individualism and sensitivity of 
investment to stock prices 
 
This paper defines social environment of a country by ethnic fractionalization 
(ETHNIC), linguistic fractionalization (LINGUISTIC), and religious fractionalization 
(RELIGIOUS). These variables indicate the probability that two randomly selected 
individuals from a country are from different ethnic, linguistic, or religious groups. We argue 
that the social environment of a country can be instrumental in determining the effect of 
individualism on sensitivity of investment to stock prices. Alesina et al. (2003) and Alesina 
and Spolaore (2003) argue that heterogeneity in society (fractionalization) is an important 
determinant of political stability, quality of institutions, and economic policies. Prior 
literature documents that, in highly diverse societies, the group that comes to power tends 
to implement policies that expropriate as many resources as possible from the ethnic losers, 
restrict the rights of other groups, and prohibit the growth of industries or sectors that 
threaten the ruling group (Annet, 2001; Alesina et al., 1999; Easterly and Levine, 1997). 
When these results are applied to the financial sector, the implications are clear: greater 
ethnic diversity implies the adoption of policies and institutions that are focused on 
maintaining power and control, rather than on creating an open and competitive financial 
system (Beck et al., 2003). Given the adverse impact of social heterogeneity on economic and 
institutional indicators, we expect less informative stock prices in countries with 
heterogeneous societies. As a result, we expect lower sensitivity of investment to stock prices 
in individualistic cultures with high social heterogeneity than individualistic cultures with 
low social heterogeneity. 
 
Sub hypothesis 3a: Sensitivity of investment to stock prices is lower in individualistic cultures 
with higher ethnic fractionalization than in individualistic cultures with lower ethnic 
fractionalization. 
 
Sub hypothesis 3b: Sensitivity of investment to stock prices is lower in individualistic cultures 
with higher linguistic fractionalization than in individualistic cultures with lower linguistic 
fractionalization.  
 
Sub hypothesis 3c: Sensitivity of investment to stock prices is lower in individualistic cultures 
with higher religious fractionalization than in individualistic cultures with lower religious 
fractionalization. 
 
In order to document the effect of country-specific social environment on the 
relationship between individualism and sensitivity of investment to stock prices, we 
introduce the following interaction terms in Equation (1): Q*IND*ETHNIC, 
Q*IND*LINGUISTIC, and Q*IND*RELIGIOUS. The results of our analysis are reported in Table 
7. Our results confirm our arguments of significant impact of social characteristics on the 
relationship between individualism and sensitivity of investment to stock prices. We report 
significantly negative coefficient of Q*IND*ETHNIC and Q*IND*LINGUISTIC. It indicates that 
the effect of individualism reduces sensitivity of investment to stock prices more in countries 
with heterogeneous societies than in countries with homogeneous societies. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we test the hypothesis that individualism affects the ability of managers 
to use information from the stock market to make value enhancing investment decisions. 
Our results show that the investment of firms headquartered in individualistic cultures is 
significantly less sensitive to their stock prices than that of firms headquartered in 
collectivist cultures. This finding is significant and robust to a host of estimation procedures. 
We also show that the effect of individualism on sensitivity of investment to stock prices is 
moderated by the institutional, cultural, and social environment of a country. Individualistic 
countries with stronger institutions have higher sensitivity of investment to stock prices 
than individualistic countries with weaker institutions. Our results also show that the effect 
of individualism on sensitivity of investment to stock prices is higher in countries with high 
power distance and lower in countries with high uncertainty avoidance and high 
masculinity. Furthermore, we also show that firms headquartered in heterogeneous 
societies have more negative impact of individualism on sensitivity of investment to stock 
prices than firms headquartered in homogeneous societies. 
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Appendix 1: Definition of variables 
 
NOTATION Definition Source 
Q It is computed as market value of equity plus book value of 
assets minus the book value of equity, scaled by book assets. 
Worldscope 
IND It is the measure of individualism in a country. It ranges from 0 
to 100, where 0 refers to full collectivism and 100 to full 
individualism. 
Hofstede’s Cultural 
Indicators 
SIZE Log of total assets Worldscope 
LEVERAGE Total debt to total asset ratio Worldscope 
GROWTH One year growth in total assets Worldscope 
EPS Earnings per share Worldscope 
ANALYST Total number of analysts issuing forecasts for a firm during a 
year 
I/B/E/S 
IFRS It is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm used 
IFRS as an accounting standard and 0 otherwise. 
Worldscope 
RLAW It measures the extent to which agents abide by the rules. It 
includes perceptions of the incidence of crime, the effectiveness 
and predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of 
contracts. It measures the success of a society in developing an 
environment in which fair and predictable rules form the basis 
for economic and social interactions. 
World Bank’s 
Governance Indicators 
FINVEST It is a measure of overall investment climate and scrutinizes 
country’s policies toward foreign investment, as well as its 
policies toward capital flows. It ranges between 0 and 100. 
Heritage Foundation 
FTRADE It measures the presence of trade barriers in a country. It ranges 
between 0 and 100. 
Heritage Foundation 
PDISTANCE It refers to the extent to which the society accepts unequal 
distribution of power within itself. It ranges from 0 to 100. 
Hofstede’s Cultural 
Indicators 
UAVOIDANCE It measures the extent to which people feel uncomfortable with 
uncertain circumstances. It ranges from 0 to 100, where 0 refers 
to full uncertainty seeking and 100 to full uncertainty avoidance. 
Hofstede’s Cultural 
Indicators 
MASCULINITY It is the measure of masculinity in a country. It ranges from 0 to 
100, where 0 refers to full femininity and 100 to full masculinity. 
Hofstede’s Cultural 
Indicators 
ETHINC It reflects the probability that two randomly selected people 
from a given country will not share same ethnicity. The higher 
the number, the less probability of the two sharing same 
ethnicity. 
Alesina et. al (2003) 
LINGUISTIC It reflects the probability that two randomly selected people 
from a given country will not share same language. The higher 
the number, the less probability of the two sharing same 
language. 
Alesina et. al (2003) 
RELIGIOUS It reflects the probability that two randomly selected people 
from a given country will not share same religion. The higher 
the number, the less probability of the two sharing same 
religion. 
Alesina et. al (2003) 
 
 
 
  
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for individualism 
 
Country Region Individualism Country Region Individualism 
Argentina Latin America 46 Bangladesh Asia 20 
Brazil Latin America 38 China Asia 20 
Chile Latin America 23 India Asia 48 
Colombia Latin America 13 Indonesia Asia 14 
Mexico Latin America 30 Malaysia Asia 26 
Peru Latin America 16 Pakistan Asia 14 
Venezuela Latin America 12 Philippines Asia 32 
Bulgaria Europe 30 South Korea Asia 18 
Czech Republic Europe 72 Sri Lanka Asia 35 
Greece Europe 35 Taiwan Asia 17 
Hungary Europe 80 Thailand Asia 20 
Poland Europe 60 Vietnam Asia 20 
Romania Europe 30 Israel Asia 54 
Russia Europe 39 Jordan Asia 30 
Turkey Europe 37 Kuwait Asia 25 
Egypt Africa 25 Saudi Arabia Asia 25 
Morocco Africa 46 United Arab 
Emirates 
Asia 25 
Ghana Africa 15    
Nigeria Africa 30    
South Africa Africa 65    
 
 
 
  
 
 
Table 2: Individualism and sensitivity of investment to stock prices 
 
Variables Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
Q 0.9385*** 1.3431*** 1.2766*** 1.4425*** 0.8216*** 
IND 0.0426*** 0.0234*** 0.0214*** 0.0137*** 0.0332*** 
Q*IND -0.0130*** -0.0134*** -0.0126*** -0.0156*** -0.0116*** 
      
SIZE 0.3275***    0.4570*** 
LEVERAGE 0.0160***    0.0111*** 
GROWTH 0.0067***    0.0061*** 
EPS 0.1912***    0.0994*** 
ANALYST 0.0369***    0.0163** 
IFRS -1.2068***    -0.2917** 
      
RLAW  -0.3592**   0.5347 
FINVEST  -0.0105**   0.0302*** 
FTRADE  -0.1016***   -0.1151*** 
      
PDISTANCE   -0.0001  0.0117*** 
UAVOIDANCE   -0.0200***  -0.0086** 
MASCULINITY   -0.0017  -0.0168*** 
      
ETHINC    -3.3281*** -1.8080*** 
LINGUISTIC    2.5172*** 1.9264*** 
RELIGIOUS    0.0373 -0.5838** 
      
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
No. of 
Observations 
40904 45599 45599 45599 40904 
F-Value 90.78*** 77.17*** 65.97*** 65.56*** 78.06*** 
Adjusted R-Square 0.0466 0.0379 0.0325 0.0333 0.0563 
 
 
  
Table 3: Individualism and sensitivity of investment to stock prices (quantile regression approach) 
  
Variables Quantile = 
0.10 
Quantile = 
0.30 
Quantile = 
0.50 
Quantile = 
0.70 
Quantile = 
0.90 
Q -0.0008 0.2636*** 0.5420*** 1.2355*** 2.5960*** 
IND 0.0034*** 0.0222*** 0.0342*** 0.0551*** 0.0490** 
Q*IND -0.0010* -0.0079*** -0.0127*** -0.0256*** -0.0270** 
      
SIZE 0.1404*** 0.3808*** 0.5536*** 0.6928*** 0.5332*** 
LEVERAGE 0.0006*** 0.0012 0.0037** 0.0107*** 0.0342*** 
GROWTH 0.0004*** 0.0018*** 0.0039*** 0.0069*** 0.0136*** 
EPS 0.0170 0.0901*** 0.1212*** 0.2082*** 0.2086*** 
ANALYST 0.0366*** 0.0415*** 0.0395*** 0.0188 0.0011 
IFRS 0.0542*** 0.0401 -0.0474 -0.3663** -0.3754 
      
RLAW 0.0537 -0.3441* -0.3479 0.0787 2.5911** 
FINVEST -0.0019 0.0022 0.0119*** 0.0399*** 0.1119*** 
FTRADE -0.0066*** -0.0147*** -0.0436*** -0.1217*** -0.3165*** 
      
PDISTANCE -0.0013* 0.0016 0.0093*** 0.0271*** 0.0660*** 
UAVOIDANCE -0.0008 -0.0053*** -0.0035 -0.0001 -0.0046 
MASCULINITY -0.0016** -0.0115*** -0.0210*** -0.0260*** -0.0126 
      
ETHINC -0.1343* -0.7450*** -1.6083*** -2.6211*** -4.6320*** 
LINGUISTIC -0.0091 0.2025 1.1750*** 2.6009*** 6.4568*** 
RELIGIOUS 0.0003 0.1368 0.1488 0.1516 -1.8470*** 
      
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
No. of 
Observations 
40904 40904 40904 40904 40904 
Pseudo R-Square 0.0266 0.0508 0.0580 0.0581 0.0531 
 
 
 
  
Table 4: Individualism and sensitivity of investment to stock prices in different sub-samples 
 
Variables Small Firms Large Firms 
Q 1.1378*** 0.9593*** 
IND 0.0296*** 0.0360*** 
Q*IND -0.0128 -0.0143** 
   
SIZE 0.5589*** 0.1735*** 
LEVERAGE 0.0016 0.0250*** 
GROWTH 0.0061*** 0.0066*** 
EPS 0.4735*** -0.0190 
ANALYST 0.7402*** 0.0531*** 
IFRS -0.4209** 0.0525 
   
RLAW 1.2075* -0.7810* 
FINVEST 0.0243** 0.0257** 
FTRADE -0.1471*** -0.0524*** 
   
PDISTANCE 0.0019 0.0116** 
UAVOIDANCE -0.0128* -0.0118* 
MASCULINITY 0.0144* -0.0387*** 
   
ETHINC -0.6521 -3.3039*** 
LINGUISTIC 0.7259 2.0251*** 
RELIGIOUS -0.6664 0.2202 
   
Industry Dummies Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes 
   
No. of Observations 21019 19885 
F-Value 30.37*** 34.01*** 
Adjusted R-Square 0.0453 0.0534 
 
 
  
Table 5: Effect of country-specific institutional environment on the relationship between 
individualism and sensitivity of investment to stock prices 
 
Variables Model (6) Model (7) Model (8) 
Q 1.0095*** 1.0631*** 0.9038*** 
IND 0.0379*** 0.0381*** 0.0339*** 
Q*IND -0.0188*** -0.0398*** -0.1215*** 
    
SIZE 0.4713*** 0.4651*** 0.4775*** 
LEVERAGE 0.0109*** 0.0108*** 0.0111*** 
GROWTH 0.0061*** 0.0061*** 0.0062*** 
EPS 0.0952*** 0.0871*** 0.0802** 
ANALYST 0.0152* 0.0192** 0.0214*** 
IFRS -0.2838** -0.2954** -0.3421*** 
    
RLAW -0.3191 0.5589 0.4685 
FINVEST 0.0336*** 0.0093 0.0279*** 
FTRADE -0.1279*** -0.1330*** -0.1817*** 
    
Q*IND*RLAW 0.0198***   
Q*IND*FINVEST  0.0004***  
Q*IND*FTRADE   0.0014*** 
    
PDISTANCE 0.0183*** 0.0164*** 0.0168*** 
UAVOIDANCE -0.0076* -0.0051 -0.0084** 
MASCULINITY -0.0176*** -0.0162*** -0.0197*** 
    
ETHINC -2.0109*** -1.9160*** -1.7420*** 
LINGUISTIC 2.1239*** 2.2580*** 2.3685*** 
RELIGIOUS -0.2520 -0.4760* -0.5639** 
    
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
    
No. of Observations 40904 40904 40904 
F-Value 78.86*** 77.88*** 81.54*** 
Adjusted R-Square 0.0575 0.0577 0.0586 
 
  
Table 6: Effect of country-specific cultural environment on the relationship between individualism 
and sensitivity of investment to stock prices 
 
Variables Model (9) Model (10) Model (11) 
Q 0.9868*** 0.9904*** 0.8456*** 
IND 0.0366*** 0.0288*** 0.0352*** 
Q*IND 0.0059 -0.0431*** -0.0303*** 
    
SIZE 0.4573*** 0.4631*** 0.4651*** 
LEVERAGE 0.0111*** 0.0105*** 0.0113*** 
GROWTH 0.0061*** 0.0061*** 0.0062*** 
EPS 0.0969*** 0.0851*** 0.0957*** 
ANALYST 0.0198** 0.0210*** 0.0153* 
IFRS -0.3151** -0.2030 -0.2814** 
    
RLAW 0.5195 0.6846** 0.4299 
FINVEST 0.0261*** 0.0321*** 0.0288*** 
FTRADE -0.1247*** -0.1408*** -0.1122*** 
    
PDISTANCE 0.0281*** 0.0132*** 0.0117*** 
UAVOIDANCE -0.0056 -0.0243*** -0.0095** 
MASCULINITY -0.0160*** -0.0120** -0.0322*** 
    
Q*IND*PDISTANCE -0.0003***   
Q*IND*UAVOIDANCE  0.0005***  
Q*IND*MASCULINITY   0.0003* 
    
ETHINC -1.9801*** -1.8879*** -1.9033*** 
LINGUISTIC 2.1701*** 2.4837*** 1.8750*** 
RELIGIOUS -0.7936*** -0.4765* -0.6225** 
    
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
    
No. of Observations 40904 40904 40904 
F-Value 76.10*** 79.41*** 77.00*** 
Adjusted R-Square 0.0570 0.0582 0.0565 
 
 
  
Table 7: Effect of country-specific social environment on the relationship between individualism and 
sensitivity of investment to stock prices 
 
Variables Model (12) Model (13) Model (14) 
Q 0.7470*** 0.5361*** 0.8554*** 
IND 0.0320*** 0.0207*** 0.0347*** 
Q*IND -0.0040 0.0085 -0.0096** 
    
SIZE 0.4660*** 0.4719*** 0.4580*** 
LEVERAGE 0.0111*** 0.0108*** 0.0111*** 
GROWTH 0.0061*** 0.0062*** 0.0061*** 
EPS 0.0983*** 0.0904*** 0.0985*** 
ANALYST 0.0161* 0.0186** 0.0161* 
IFRS -0.2750** -0.2172* -0.2722** 
    
RLAW 0.5351 0.7261** 0.5081 
FINVEST 0.0329*** 0.0391*** 0.0293*** 
FTRADE -0.1208*** -0.1318*** -0.1155*** 
    
PDISTANCE 0.0113*** 0.0125*** 0.0107*** 
UAVOIDANCE -0.0093** -0.0100** -0.0084** 
MASCULINITY -0.0177*** -0.0168*** -0.0166*** 
    
ETHINC -1.1777** -1.8881*** -1.7071*** 
LINGUISTIC 1.9323*** 3.1709*** 1.9003*** 
RELIGIOUS -0.4029 -0.4598* -0.2452 
    
Q*IND*ETHINC -0.0148*   
Q*IND*LINGUISTIC  -0.0234***  
Q*IND*RELIGIOUS   -0.0069 
    
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
    
No. of Observations 40904 40904 40904 
F-Value 75.92*** 78.30*** 75.68*** 
Adjusted R-Square 0.0564 0.0570 0.0563 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
